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Abstract
We study the network replicator equation and characterize its fixed points on arbitrary
graph structures for 2 × 2 symmetric games. We show a relationship between the asymptotic
behavior of the network replicator and the existence of an independent vertex set in the graph
and also show that complex behavior cannot emerge in 2 × 2 games. This links a property of
the dynamical system with a combinatorial graph property. We contrast this by showing that
ordinary rock-paper-scissors (RPS) exhibits chaos on the 3-cycle and that on general graphs
with ≥ 3 vertices the network replicator with RPS is a generalized Hamiltonian system. This
stands in stark contrast to the established fact that RPS does not exhibit chaos in the standard
replicator dynamics or the bimatrix replicator dynamics, which is equivalent to the network
replicator on a graph with one edge and two vertices (K2).
1 Introduction
The Hamiltonian approach to the dynamics of complicated, interacting systems has had substantial
success in providing a mathematical understanding of the world, yielding key results in classical,
celestial, statistical, and quantum mechanics. Surprisingly, the evolutionary dynamics of games,
which have been studied extensively over the last 40 years (see e.g. [1–10]) can in some cases be
shown to possess a Hamiltonian structure, stemming from the dynamical description implicit in
the replicator equation for the evolution of strategy choices [11–13]. The replicator equation is
one of several differential equations proposed for evolutionary games [6, 9, 14] and it has also been
generalized to many situations, including the coevolutionary dynamics of multiple games (different
payoff matrices) [11,12,15–17]. The simplest case is the bimatrix formulation [11,12], with dynamics
given by: {
x˙i = xi (ei − x)Ay
y˙i = yi (ei − y)Bx.
(1)
Here we have two interacting species, with strategy proportion vectors x(t) and y(t) and corre-
sponding game matrices A and B (fully generalized in [17]). For the bimatrix replicator, it has
been shown that all interior equilibria (corresponding to coexisting strategies or phenotypes within
a species) are unstable [11]. As we discuss below, when each species plays the same game (A = BT ),
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Figure 1: Rock-Paper-Scissors dynamics in the network replicator: (L) projection of 9-dimensional
trajectories following (nested) surfaces in R3; (R) Poincare´ sections of four different initial condi-
tions, showing three quasiperiodic (color spectrum) and one chaotic (grey).
this is identical to the network replicator (Eq. (2)) on the graph with two vertices and one edge
(the graph K2).
When A = B is symmetric, and the bimatrix equation is further symmetrized to a single species
with x = y, then Eq. (1) becomes the ordinary replicator equation. Zeeman and others have shown
that chaotic behavior does not occur in the ordinary replicator with three or fewer strategies [2,3];
however chaotic behavior can emerge with four strategies [18]. Thinking of Eq. (1) as network
replicator on K2 [19–21], Sato and others have shown [13,22,23] that chaotic behavior can emerge
in three strategy games, however not the ordinary rock-paper-scissors (RPS) game [13]. Similarly,
for the classical replicator, work by [10–13] makes it clear that ordinary RPS and its generalizations
are Hamiltonian systems, but do not exhibit chaos.
In this paper, we show that by enlarging the network from two nodes (the bimatrix case,
K2) to three (the three-cycle, K3), the network replicator admits chaotic behavior for ordinary
RPS, as illustrated in Fig. 1. Moreover, the network replicator equation possesses a generalized
Hamiltonian structure on an arbitrary graph. Our approach also leads to a surprising link between
a combinatorial aspect of the graph structure and the asymptotic behavior of the time-evolving
strategy for two strategy games. To our knowledge, this is the first connection made between the
asymptotic or chaotic behavior in an evolutionary game or coevolutionary dynamics on graphs and
the graph structure itself.
Let G = (V,E) be a graph consisting of n > 1 vertices, each representing a player, with
V = {1, . . . , n}. For simplicity, we will use a common (single) payoff matrix A ∈ Rm×m. Following
[21], each vertex is a player who may use a mixed strategy of dimension m in a symmetric game
(repeatedly) played against neighboring vertices. In this case, the network replicator equation is
x˙ij = xij
 ∑
k∈N(i)
(ej − xi) ·Axk
 (2)
where N(i) are the neighbors of vertex i. The network replicator has been studied recently in the
control literature [24–28] with a special focus on 2×2 games. While there are several derivations of
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the network replicator in the literature, we provide a straightforward derivation from a population
model perspective in Appendix A.
2 Asymptotic Behavior of 2× 2 Games
We first show that the dynamics of 2 × 2 games are in some sense simple and related to certain
combinatorial properties of the graph structure. We begin by characterizing the fixed points of
Eq. (2) in 2× 2 games. Without loss of generality (see Appendix B), assume the payoff matrix is
of the form:
A =
[
0 r
s 0
]
.
This includes anti-coordination games (r > 0, s > 0) and Prisoner’s Dilemma-type games (rs < 0).
The fact that we have only two strategies (j ∈ {1, 2}) simplifies the analysis substantially. Let
xi ∈ [0, 1] be the fraction of the time player i plays Strategy 1, and xi = 〈xi, 1− xi〉. Then the
network replicator for node i becomes
x˙i = xi(1− xi)
 ∑
j∈N(i)
r − (r + s)xj
 . (3)
Thus any fixed point x∗ = 〈x∗1, . . . , x∗n〉 of Eq. (3) must have, for each vertex i, either xi = 0, xi = 1
(the pure strategies), or
1
|N(i)|
∑
j∈N(i)
xj =
r
r + s
(4)
(assuming r + s 6= 0). This final condition specifies the average of the neighboring strategies
surrounding i.
The stability of any x∗ is determined by the eigenvalues of the corresponding Jacobian matrix.
For the network replicator, these eigenvalues must be real for 2 × 2 games (see Appendix B). To
examine the stability of x∗, we define S ⊂ V to be the set of vertices for which the player is playing
a mixed strategy, i.e. if i ∈ V , then x∗i ∈ (0, 1). Let G[S] denote the subgraph of G generated by
the vertices in S. We now analyze the fixed points in two distinct cases:
(i) r and s have opposite signs (Prisoner’s Dilemma type). The right hand side of Eq. (4) cannot
be in [0, 1], so there can be no vertices with a mixed strategy. Thus S = ∅, and x∗ is a pure strategy
fixed point. In this case the Jacobian matrix is diagonal, consequently x∗ is hyperbolic and admits
no circulation. Moreover, the defect strategy will be asymptotically stable for all players.
(ii) r and s have the same sign. Assume r, s > 0 without loss of generality; it is now possible
for S to be non-empty. Analysis of the Jacobian matrix shows that x∗ is unstable whenever G[S]
has an edge (see Appendix B). Thus the asymptotic dynamics is linked to a combinatorial property
of the graph structure: the existence of an independent set of vertices in G. This is illustrated in
Fig. 2.
Thus neither circulation nor chaotic behavior is possible in the 2 × 2 payoff matrix case. In
general, solutions always converge to a (neutrally) stable fixed point as a result of the compactness
of the manifold ∆mk , since the eigenvalues of the Jacobian are always real. Furthermore, any vertices
that play mixed strategies must form an independent set in the graph (i.e. are not connected by an
edge); this effectively limits the number of vertices that can play a mixed strategy at equilibrium.
Thus the network replicator predicts that, in any ecological network defined by a 2 × 2 game, no
two interacting species can both include coexisting strategies at equilibrium.
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Figure 2: The evolution of the network replicator on the Karate Club graph for a 2 × 2 anti-
coordination game: (Left) convergence to a steady state x∗ from random initial conditions; (Right)
structure of x∗, showing pure (circles) and mixed (star-shape) strategy vertices, with color distin-
guishing strategy choice (see text).
3 Chaotic Dynamics in Simple 3-Strategy Games
While the dynamics of the network replicator are simple for 2 × 2 games, we show numerically
that chaotic behavior emerges in the classic (symmetric) RPS game when played on a three node
network with three edges (the 3-cycle K3); note that no chaotic behavior is observed on the two
node network, as shown (unintentionally) in [13] for the classic RPS as a bimatrix game. In the
standard replicator, this game has a single interior elliptic fixed point. Generalizations of the RPS
game are discussed in [7], whose dynamics are entirely classified by Zeeman, who showed that no
limit cycles can emerge [2].
Consider the network replicator on K3, with the three nodes playing RPS defined by the payoff
matrix
A =
 0 −1 11 0 −1
−1 1 0
 (5)
Straightforward analysis shows that the system has an infinite number of fixed points (see Ap-
pendix C), which can be classified into three pure strategies, a continuum of boundary strategies
(where one strategy is chosen with zero probability), and one interior fixed point
〈
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3
〉
.
Define the vector valued function F : ∆33 → R9 so that the network replicator dynamics are
x˙ = F(x). Simple computation shows that shows that ∇·F = 0, i.e., the system is conservative. As
a consequence, the interior fixed point must be a non-linear (elliptical) center, and the boundary
fixed points are non-attracting. We show that this property of the network replicator leads to
periodic, quasi-periodic and chaotic dynamics, a result similar to what is found in [23], but with
simpler dynamics. We also note, this is a variation on the result in [11] which argues that the
ordinary replicator on two species preserves a certain volume form.
Long phase portraits from various starting points illustrate both quasi-periodic and chaotic
motion. The phase portraits in Fig. 3 were constructed using a ternary transform on the dynamics
of Vertex 1 alone for the K3 network, and shows that chaotic behavior seems to emerge as the
initial condition is moved further from the interior fixed point. A corresponding three-dimensional
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trajectory slice is shown Fig. 1 (Left). These surfaces are symmetric and illustrate the relationships
between rock at Vertex 1, paper at Vertex 2 and scissors at Vertex 3. A two dimensional Poincare´
section is shown in Fig. 1 (Right) with the corresponding chaotic trajectory shown in Fig. 3, in
which densely packed orbits appear relatively well-behaved when the initial condition is close to the
interior fixed point. However, when the orbit is started further away, it oscillates filling up more
space. This is qualitatively similar to the double pendulum, which when started close to its hanging
equilibrium displays simple motion, but exhibits chaotic motion when released far away from the
equilibrium point [29]. Simple, neutrally stable orbits also exist, as we show in the Appendix E.
To quantify (and in some sense prove numerically) that this system is chaotic, we computed
the Lyapunov exponents using the technique in [30] and implemented in [31–33]. The maximum
Lyapunov exponent in this case is shown in Fig. 4 (Top). The fact that the maximum Lyapunov
exponent is positive and the domain of the dynamics is compact (i.e., ∆33) is sufficient to show
that the system exhibits chaos [30, 34]. The sum of the computed Lyapunov exponents is 1.3 ×
10−7, consistent with the conservative nature of the flow in phase space (see e.g., Page 57 of
[35]). We illustrate the sensitive dependence on initial conditions in Fig. 4 (Bottom) by computing
the (discrete) entropy of trajectories with various initial conditions. The figure displays the fine
structure associated with chaotic behavior. (Details are provided in the Appendices D and D.1.)
4 Generalized Hamiltonian Dynamics
Motivated by the presence of quasi-periodic orbits and the emergence of chaotic behavior in this
system, we show that a generalized Hamiltonian exists for a diffeomorphic transformation of RPS
on a general graph. To help explain the complex conjugate momenta identified in the generalized
Hamiltonian, we show that the linearized behavior of the RPS game on K3 near the interior
fixed point is a degenerate Hamiltonian system with more readily explainable (ordinary) conjugate
momenta.
We first consider the general case of an arbitrary graph G = (V,E) with n vertices and using
an arbitrary payoff matrix A. We derive a generalized Hamiltonian dynamics for a diffeomorphic
transformation of the network replicator (see Appendix F for details). Applying the approach
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Figure 3: Rock-paper-scissors on a K3 network: phase portraits for Vertex 1 with initial conditions
close to (Left) and far from (Right) the interior fixed point.
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Figure 4: Sensitive dependence on initial conditions in the RPS game: (Top) computed maximum
Lyapunov exponent for the dynamics [30]; (Bottom) density plot showing (discrete) entropy of
trajectories as a function of initial point in the simplex.
in [12,22,23], where each strategy proportion is normalized by the last nonzero strategy, we define:
ui,j = log
(
xi,j
xi,n
)
. (6)
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Following Crutchfield [22, 23], this can be interpreted in an information-theoretic way, since each
xi,j/xi,n is just a relative probability; i.e each log-probability is an information measure for each
vertex i. Moreover, this is a diffeomorphism on the interior of the phase space ∆nm. Using this
transformation, the modified dynamics are:
u˙i,j =
∑
k∈N(i)
(ej − em) ·A exp(uk)
1 +
∑
l 6=m exp(uk,l)
. (7)
Using the RPS payoff matrix and simplifying yields:
u˙i,1 =
∑
k∈N(i)
(
1− 3e
uk,2
1 +
∑
j 6=m e
uk,j
)
u˙i,2 =
∑
k∈N(i)
(
−1 + 3e
uk,1
1 +
∑
j 6=m e
uk,j
)
.
(8)
Examining Eq. (8), we see that ui,1 is in a sense conjugate to a nonlinear combination of uk,2
(k ∈ N(i)) while ui,2 is similarly conjugate to a nonlinear combination of uk,1. This is made explicit
by defining:
H =
∑
i
∑
j
ui,j −
∑
i
3 log (1 + eui,1 + eui,2) (9)
Differentiating this generalized Hamiltonian shows that:
for i = 1, 2

u˙i,1 =
∑
k∈N(i)
∂H
∂uk,2
u˙i,2 =
∑
k∈N(i)
− ∂H
∂uk,1
(10)
The existence of a generalized Hamiltonian explains the presence of chaotic behavior far from the
interior elliptic fixed point (Fig. 4), and also indicates that for RPS, the network replicator provides
an example of a generalized Hamiltonian system satisfying Lioville’s Theorem. Fig. 5 shows this
generalized Hamiltonian chaos in the complete four species network K4. As in K3, the trajectories
are well behaved when the initial conditions are near the interior fixed point (Fig. 5-top), but chaos
seems to emerge for initial condition further away (Fig. 5-bottom).
This relationship between coordinates and conjugate momenta can be better understood con-
ceptually by linearizing the network replicator around the RPS interior fixed point, which leads to
a degenerate Hamiltonian system. We illustrate this for K3 here, but the approach is similar for
arbitrary graphs. Let xi,3 = 1−xi,1−xi,2 for i = 1, 2, 3. This reduces the dimension of the network
replicator to six. Linearizing this system near the elliptic interior fixed point yields:
x˙i,1 =
1
3
∑
j 6=i
−xj,1 − 2xj,2

x˙i,2 =
1
3
∑
j 6=i
2xj,1 + xj,2

If we define the following (conjugate momenta) variables:
7
Figure 5: Network replicator phase portraits for RPS on the four-cycle graph K4: (top) trajectories
for initial conditions near the interior fixed point; (bottom) chaotic trajectories for initial conditions
further away.
8
pi,1 =
∑
j 6=i
xj,2 pi,2 =
∑
j 6=i
xj,1
then the linearized reduced dimensional system can be written as:
∀i

3x˙i,1 = −pi,2 − 2pi,1
3x˙i,2 = 2pi,2 + pi,1
3p˙i,1 = 4xi,1 + 2xi,2 +
∑
j 6=i
2xj,1 +
∑
j 6=i
xj,2
3p˙i,2 = −2xi,1 − 4xi,2 −
∑
j 6=i
xj,1 −
∑
j 6=i
2xj,2
(11)
The conjugate momenta for xi,1 have game-theoretic meaning: the pi,1 are the strategies of other
players that result in non-zero payoff for player 1, while the pi,2 are strategies resulting in non-zero
payoffs for player 2.
The Hamiltonian for this linearized system is:
3H0 =
∑
i
p2i,1 + p
2
i,2 + pi,1pi,2 +
∑
i
2x2i,1 + 2x
2
i,2+∑
j
2xi,1xi,2 +
∑
i
∑
j>i
2xi,1xj,1+∑
i
∑
j>i
2xi,2xj,2 +
∑
i
xi,2
∑
j 6=i
xj,1. (12)
Thus the reduced dimensional system behaves like a degenerate (12 dimensional) Hamiltonian
system near the fixed point. Consequently, we expect to see quasi-periodic orbits tracing foliated
n-tori reasonably close to the interior fixed point (Fig. 1). A similar analysis shows that on K4,
near the interior fixed point, the linearized system exhibits degenerate 16 dimensional Hamiltonian
dynamics (see Appendix G). This result should generalize to arbitrary graph structures.
5 Conclusions
What we have seen here is that there is a fundamental difference between two-strategy and three-
strategy games in network replicator dynamics. In the two strategy case the dynamics are simple:
there is no circulation in phase space, and trajectories correspondingly must always converge to
some stable fixed point. The stability of these underlying fixed points is related both to the payoff
matrix and the structure of an independent set composed of vertices playing mixed strategies. Our
results raise an interesting question on the relationship between the combinatorial properties of
graphs and equilibria of the network replicator, since determining the independence number of
a graph is NP-hard [36]. In contrast, chaotic behavior emerges in ordinary rock, paper scissors
when played on the 3-cycle. For any graph with more than two vertices, the network replicator
is a generalized Hamiltonian system for the RPS game. We hypothesize that the resulting nested
manifolds observed near the interior fixed point are generalized KAM surfaces. To support this, we
show for K3 that the linearized dynamics near the fixed point results in a degenerate Hamiltonian
system in 12 dimensional space.
While the well-known KAM Theorem applies most directly to systems with a proper non-
integrable Hamiltonian, there may be extensions of the KAM theorem for more generalized Hamil-
tonian dynamics, such as the type we have found here. Beyond this, there remains the question
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of whether there is any deeper meaning to the Hamiltonian structure of these equations that
might involve the information or entropy of evolving strategy choices in network evolutionary sys-
tems [22,23].
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A Derivation of the Network Replicator
We use x = 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 to denote a column vector in Rn. Let ∆m denote the m − 1-dimensional
simplex embedded in Rm defined by:
∆n =
{
x ∈ Rm :
m∑
i=1
xi = 1 and 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1
}
. (13)
Let G = (V,E) be a graph consisting of n > 1 vertices. For simplicity, let V = {1, . . . , n}.
Following [21], each vertex is a player (type) who may use a mixed strategy in a symmetric game
(repeatedly) played against other vertices and governed by the payoff matrix A ∈ Rm×m. Let
Xij(t) be a count of the number of times Player (vertex) i has played strategy j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} at
time t. If:
Mi(t) =
∑
j
Xij(t) (14)
and:
xij(t) =
Xij(t)
Mi(t)
, (15)
then the vector xi(t) = 〈xi1(t), . . . , xin(t)〉 represents the current mixed strategy of Player i at time
t. For simplicity, we will suppress time in the notation unless needed for the remainder of this
paper. Suppose the strategy counts of the players change according to the expected payoff rule :
X˙ij = Xij
 1
|N(i)|
∑
k∈N(i)
ej ·Axk
 (16)
Here (·) denotes the standard Euclidean dot product and N(i) denotes the graph-theoretic neigh-
borhood of Player (Vertex) i. This approach is precisely the one taken in [17] when vertices are
treated as species while the strategies at each vertex are treated as sub-species. Unlike [17] the
exact species proportions (vertex counts) are fixed, making the analysis of Eq. (16) simpler. For
completeness, we note in the dynamics of Eq. (16), it is possible for counts to decrease if∑
k∈N(i)
ej ·Axk < 0
In this case, we might assume a player “forgets” his prior plays. In general, this can be ignored
by rescaling A so it is always positive; additionally we will only be concerned with proportions
throughout the remainder of this paper.
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Following the derivation in [17] – i.e. applying the quotient rule to compute x˙ij yields:
∀i, j
x˙ij = 1|N(i)|xij
 ∑
k∈N(i)
(ej − xi) ·Axk

The constants |N(i)| adjust the flow speed and can be eliminated to obtain the ordinary network
replicator:
∀i, j
x˙ij = xij
 ∑
k∈N(i)
(ej − xi) ·Axk
 ,
which is Eq. (2).
B Analysis of the Jacobian of 2× 2 Games
For an arbitrary 2× 2 game, assume the payoff matrix has form:
A =
[
0 r
s 0
]
.
For the network replicator, (as in the ordinary replicator [5]), an arbitrary payoff matrix can
be modified by subtracting or adding (different) constants to each column without changing the
structure of fixed points so long as the ordering of the entries remains fixed. Consequently the
network replicator for a 2× 2 payoff matrix is
x˙i = xi(1− xi)
 ∑
j∈N(i)
r − (r + s)xj
 .
Differentiating, we see that the components of the Jacobian matrix J(x) are:
Jij(x) =

(1− 2xi)
(∑
j∈N(i) r − (r + s)xj
)
if i = j
−xi(1− xi)(r + s) if j ∈ N(i)
0 otherwise
(17)
For fixed point x∗, and let S ⊂ V be the set of vertices that do not have a pure strategy; i.e. if
i ∈ V , then x∗i ∈ (0, 1). Let G[S] denote the subgraph generated by the vertices in S. We’ll analyze
the possible fixed points and eigenvalues of the corresponding Jacobian matrix in cases.
Case I: If r and s are opposite sign, then:
r
r + s
6∈ [0, 1]
and thus there are no vertices with a mixed strategy. In this case S = ∅ and G[S] has no edges.
From Eq. (17), the Jacobian matrix must be diagonal with real eigenvalues given by:
λi = (1− 2xi)
∑
j∼i
r − (r + s)xj
 (18)
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Consequently x∗ is hyperbolic and admits no circulation. Moreover, when r > 0 > s, then r− (r+
s)xj > 0 for all j because xj ∈ {0, 1}. This implies that any eigenvalue λi < 0 if and only if xi = 1.
It follows that the only stable equilibrium is the consensus strategy where all players play Strategy
1. Similarly, when s > 0 > r, then the only stable equilibrium is the consensus strategy where all
players play Strategy 2. This shows that in Prisoner’s dilemma type games, the defect strategy is
always stable for all players.
Case II: Suppose r and s have the same sign and without loss of generality suppose that
r, s > 0. In this case, it is possible for S to be non-empty.
From Eq. (17), if j 6∈ N(i), then Jij(x∗) = 0 for i 6= j. So row i of J(x∗) contains non-zero
entries only at the neighbors of i. To solve det(J(x∗) − λI) = 0, apply row reduction. We have
already noted that if i ∈ V \ S, then row i has a single non-zero entry on the diagonal and J(x∗)
has an eigenvalue given by Eq. (18). If any of these values are positive, then x∗ is unstable.
Suppose i ∈ S. By our previous assertion using row reduction on J(x∗)−λI, we can remove any
non-zero element in the columns corresponding to j ∈ V \ S, leaving only the rows and columns
corresponding to S to be diagonalized. Let Adj(G[S]) be the (symmetric) adjacency matrix of the
subgraph G[S]. Let Q(x) be the sub-matrix of the partial row-reduction just discussed. For i ∈ S,
Jii(x
∗) = 0. Careful inspection shows that:
Q(x) = −(r + s)D ·Adj(G[S])− λI,
where D is a diagonal matrix with xi(1−xi) on the diagonal. Note that D is positive definite, and
thus has a (diagonal) square root, which we denote B. The remaining eigenvalues of the Jacobian
are exactly those of of D ·Adj(G[S]). This matrix shares eigenvalues with the symmetric matrix
B ·Adj(G[S]) ·B, and thus all these eigenvalues are real by the Principal Axis Theorem.
Thus we have shown that that there is no circulation in the phase portrait of the network
replicator in 2×2 games because all eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix must be real. Consequently,
any center manifold indicates directions of neutral stability or instability.
If G[S] has any edges, then since Tr(Adj(G[S])) = 0, it follows that Adj(G[S]) has both a
positive and negative eigenvalue. Since D is positive definite, the positive eigenvalues of Adj(G[S])
imply that D·Adj(G[S]) has a positive eigenvalue. Similarly, the negative eigenvalues of Adj(G[S])
mean thatD·Adj(G[S]) has a negative eigenvalue. Since r+s can only be zero when sgn(r) 6= sgn(s)
and we assumed this was not the case, it follows that there is a positive eigenvalue whenever G[S]
has an edge. Therefore we have shown that x∗ is unstable whenever G[S] has an edge.
To summarize, we have shown the following two results:
1. If x∗ is a fixed point and the corresponding subgraph G[S] has an edge, then this fixed point
has an unstable manifold. It immediately follows that any interior fixed points are unstable.
2. For any fixed point x∗, of the network replicator with a 2× 2 payoff matrix, the eigenvalues
of the Jacobian J(x∗) are real and therefore for any initial point x0 ∈ ∆n2 , the solution curves
will tend to a rest point ω(x0) ∈ ∆n2 on the boundary. That is, neither circulation nor chaotic
behavior is possible in the network replicator with a 2× 2 payoff matrix.
In network terms, these results imply that like pure strategies will tend to be adjacent (when
possible) in coordination games, while in anti-coordination games, opposite pure strategies will
tend to be adjacent, when possible. The latter is illustrated in the main text.
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C Fixed Points of RPS on K3
Let
A =
 0 −1 11 0 −1
−1 1 0

and consider the network replicator on K3. Algebraic analysis shows that the system has an
infinite collection of fixed points that can be organized into three classes as shown in Table 1. The
parameters a, b, c and r, s, t used in specifying the boundary fixed points are chosen from the set
{1, 2, 3} with elimination. For example, one of the 36 fixed points sets r = 1, s = 2 and t = 3
and a = 2, b = 3 and c = 1 to obtain the fixed point: x1,1 = 0, x1,2 = p, x1,3 = 1 − p, x2,1 = 0,
x2,2 =
1
3(2 − 3p), x2,3 = 13(1 + 3p) and x3,1 = 23 , x3,2 = 0, x3,3 = 13 for p ∈
[
0, 23
]
. We can
Strategy Type Fixed Points
Pure Strategy
x1 = ei1 , x2 = ei2 ,
x3 = ei3
Boundary
xra = p, xrb = 1− p,
xrc = 0
xsa =
1
3(2− 3p),
xsb =
1
3(1 + 3p), xsc = 0
xta = 0, xtb =
1
3 , xtc =
2
3
Interior x1 = x2 = x3 =
〈
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3
〉
Table 1: The three classes of fixed points in the rock-paper-scissors replicator dynamic produce an
infinite set of possible fixed points.
analyze the stability of the fixed points using a reduced dimensional representation by eliminating
the redundant equation and variables; i.e., letting xi,3 = 1− xi,1 − xi,2 for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
The set of eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix varies slightly depending on the pure strategy
type (e.g., whether the pure strategy contain a representative rock, paper and scissors). Ignoring
multiplicities, the possible sets of eigenvalues are:
Λpure ∈ {{±2} , {−4,±2, 1} , {4,±2,−1} , {±1}}
Thus, the pure strategies are hyperbolic with a non-empty unstable manifold. The eigenvalues of
the Jacobian matrix about the fixed points on the boundary fall into two classes. and (ignoring
multiplicities):
Λboundary ∈
{{
−2, 0, 3p, 2− 3p,±2
3
√
σ
}
,
{
2, 0,−3p,−2 + 3p,±2
3
√
σ
}}
where σ = 9p2 − 6p− 1. Since p ∈ [0, 23], σ ≤ 0, and therefore, these fixed points have stable and
unstable manifolds as well (possibly) as slow and center manifolds because
√
σ is pure imaginary.
After discussing the interior fixed point, we show a that this system has a special property that
allows us to avoid complicated analysis in this case.
The eigenvalues of Jacobian matrix of the interior fixed point with multiplicities are:
Λint =
{
± 2i√
3
,± i√
3
}
.
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As we show in the main text, this must be an elliptic fixed point because the divergence of the
phase flow is zero everywhere. This also allows us to conclude that the boundary fixed points are
non-attracting (i.e., hyperbolic).
As a consequence of volume preservation on the interior of the state space, the following quantity
is also conserved in the network replicator with RPS on K3:
τ =
3∏
i=1
3∏
j=1
xij .
This is a novel extension of conservation of strategy products observed in [37]. It is also a variation
on the result in [11] which argues that the replicator on two species preserves a certain volume
form; in our case, the volume form is the classical Euclidean volume, consistent with the form of τ .
D Sensitive Dependence on Initial Conditions
To measure the sensitive dependence on initial conditions, we computed the entropy of symbolized
trajectories with varying initial conditions for the strategy at Vertex 1. The strategies of the other
two vertices where initialized at the interior fixed point
〈
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3
〉
. To symbolize, space was broken
into 110 × 110 grids. Then a path γ = (x11[t], x12[t], x13[t]) for t ∈ [0, 1000] was converted into the
corresponding sequence of grids. The ratio of the entropy of this sequence to the possible maximum
entropy (of a uniform random variable) was then computed. The results are shown in Fig. 4b of
the main text using a temperature scale. When orbits are started close to the interior fixed point,
they remains close to that fixed point and consequently have lower entropy. As the initial condition
of Vertex 1 is moved closer to the boundary, the orbit becomes more chaotic and the entropy
approaches that of a uniform random variable. Close observation of the figure shows color striation
indicative of nested behavior boundaries, as would be expected.
To see this effect in specific, Fig. 6 shows x1,1(t) when started from two nearby starting points:
x1(0) = x2(0) = x3(0) =
〈
9
10 ,
5
100 ,
5
100
〉
x′1(0) =
〈
901
1000 ,
495
1000 ,
495
1000
〉
,
x′2(0) = x
′
3(0) =
〈
9
10 ,
5
100 ,
5
100
〉
As we expect from a chaotic system, the solutions start close to each other, but after t = 150, the
dynamics begin to diverge substantially.
D.1 Transition to Chaos in Solution Spectra
The transition from simple (quasi) periodic motion near the fixed point to chaotic motion close to
the boundary can be illustrated by an analysis of the spectra of one of the solution components.
In Fig. 7 the spectrum of x11(t) is computed using a sampling rate of 100Hz. The initial condition
of the dynamical system is constructed so that:
x2(0) = x3(0) =
〈
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3
〉
,
while x1(0) is constructed so that:
x12(0) = x13(0) =
1
2
(1− x11(0))
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Illustration of Sensitive Dependence on Initial Conditions
Figure 6: Sensitive dependence on initial conditions is illustrated for the network replicator with
RPS on K3.
and x11(0) is chosen in the set {0.35, 0.6, 0.8, 0.9, 0.99}. Near the fixed point the spectrum shows
two dominant frequencies and the orbit is periodic. As x11(0) increase (toward the boundary),
additional frequency components enter the signal. The periodic signal becomes quasi-periodic as
the orbit traces out a high-dimensional surface. Interestingly, the signal continues to exhibit these
wild swings back toward its initial value. However, this behavior changes after t = 400 when
x11(0) = 0.99. In this case, a new behavioral regime is entered. We note that the spectrum at this
point is rich with frequencies and is consistent with the spectra of other chaotic signals (see e.g.,
Page 60-61 of [38]).
E Neutrally Stable Orbits
Within the dynamics, one can identify neutrally stable cycles that start arbitrarily far from the
interior fixed point as well. Simply requiring x1,r(t) = x2,r(t) = x3,r(t) for r = 1, 2, 3, the resulting
dynamical system has solution curves identical to those of simple ordinary RPS with the replicator
dynamic. However, these are not the only neutrally stable cycles that can emerge. Within the
chaotic dynamics of the system, there are neutrally stable closed orbits that are identical to the
orbits of traditional rock-paper-scissors running backwards in time. To see this, note that if we
impose the restriction:
x1,1(t) = x2,2(t) = x3,3(t) (19)
x1,2(t) = x2,3(t) = x3,1(t) (20)
x1,3(t) = x2,1(t) = x3,2(t) (21)
then the system of nine differential equations in the network replicator collapses to a system of
three differential:
x˙1,1 = x1,1 (x1,2 − x1,3) (22)
x˙1,2 = x1,2 (−x1,1 + x1,3) (23)
x˙1,3 = x1,3 (x1,1 − x1,2) (24)
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Figure 7: The figure illustrates the transition from periodic solutions close to the interior fixed
point to a chaotic solution far from the fixed point. In this figure x2(0) = x3(0) =
〈
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3
〉
. While
x1(0) is constructed so that x12(0) = x13(0) =
1
2(1− x11(0)) always and x11(0) is chosen in the set
{0.35, 0.6, 0.8, 0.9, 0.99}.
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Since the strategies are in order of rock, paper, scissors, these dynamics are precisely the negative
of the evolutionary ordinary RPS replicator dynamics; i.e., there are solution curves in this system
that cause the ordinary RPS dynamics to run backwards in time for each vertex. Any initial
condition satisfying Eqs. (19) to (21) will lead to such curves. This is shown in Fig. 8. This
R P
S
Figure 8: A set of neutrally stable orbits exists within the chaotic dynamics of RPS in the network
replicator on K3. These orbits act like ordinary RPS in the replicator running backwards in time.
behavior was somewhat surprising, since it runs counter to the ordinary expectation that rock will
promote its predator paper, which in turn will promote scissors. The phenomenon can be explained
by noting that the populations at the vertices are not self-interacting. Therefore, when Eqs. (19)
to (21) hold, then (e.g.) the population of scissors must be growing at the vertex dominated by rock
that is adjacent to the vertex dominated by paper. Thus the observed behavior at each vertex will
operate in reverse from the ordinary RPS [7]. However, spatially, the strategies will move around
K3 in a manner consistent with classical RPS. To see this, re-write Eqs. (22) to (24) using Eqs. (19)
to (21) to obtain:
x˙1,k = x1,1 (−x2,k + x3,k) (25)
x˙2,k = x2,1 (−x3,k + x1,k) (26)
x˙3,k = x3,1 (−x1,k + x2,k) (27)
for k = 1, 2, 3. These are the ordinary RPS equations when Vertex 1 acts as rock, Vertex 2 acts
as paper and Vertex 3 acts as scissors. The phase portraits for the strategies are shown in Fig. 9
showing the strategies cycling among the vertices of K3 and cycling in the opposite direction of the
trajectories in Fig. 8.
 

 

 

Figure 9: Phase portraits for the ternary transform of (x1,k, x2,k, x3,k) illustrating spatial “chasing”
around the graph.
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F Detailed Derivation of the Generalized Hamiltonian
We show that the general system is not a simple Hamiltonian system, but a generalized Hamiltonian
system [39]. (We note this expression is similar to Eq. (6) of [40]), which also satisfies Liouville’s
Theorem.) To see this, we apply the analysis in [12] in which strategy 3 (scissors) is divided out,
leaving (again) a 6 dimensional system. In full generality, suppose we have an m strategy game on
a graph G = (V,E) with |V | = n. Define:
yi,j =
xi,j
xi,m
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}
then by substitution and the quotient rule we have:
y˙i,j =
xi,j
xi,m
 ∑
k∈N(i)
(ej − em) ·Axk
 = xi,j
xi,m
 ∑
k∈N(i)
xk,m (ej − em) ·A xk
xk,m
 . (28)
Necessarily, yi,m = 1 and therefore y˙i,m = 0, which we will henceforth ignore. Note that:
1
xk,m
= 1 +
∑
l 6=m
xk,l
xk,m
(29)
because xk,1 + · · ·+ xk,m = 1. Substituting Eq. (29) into Eq. (28) and noting that yk,j = xk,j/xk,m
everywhere yields:
y˙i,j = yi,j
 ∑
k∈N(i)
(ej − em) ·Ayk
1 +
∑
l 6=m yk,l
 (30)
Making the substitution:
ui,j = log(yi,j)
and noting that:
u˙i,j =
y˙i,j
yi,j
,
we see that:
u˙i,j =
∑
k∈N(i)
(ej − em) ·A exp(uk)
1 +
∑
l 6=m exp(uk,l)
,
which is Eq. (7).
We now construct equations explicitly for RPS. We have:
exp(uk) =
euk,1euk,2
1

because yk,3 ≡ 1 and uk,3 = log(yk,3) = 0. Substituting this into Eq. (7) yields:
u˙i,1 =
∑
k∈N(i)
euk,1 − 2euk,2 + 1
1 + euk,1 + euk,2
(31)
u˙i,2 =
∑
k∈N(i)
2euk,1 − euk,2 − 1
1 + euk,1 + euk,2
(32)
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In general note that:
eu − 2ev + 1
1 + eu + ev
=
1 + eu + ev
1 + eu + ev
+
−3ev
1 + eu + ev
= 1− 3e
v
1 + eu + ev
and
2eu − ev − 1
1 + eu + ev
=
3eu
1 + eu + ev
− 1 + e
u + ev
1 + eu + ev
= − 1 + 3e
u
1 + eu + ev
Applying these identities to yields:
u˙i,1 =
∑
k∈N(i)
(
1− 3e
uk,2
1 + euk,1+uk,2
)
u˙i,2 =
∑
k∈N(i)
(
−1 + 3e
uk,1
1 + euk,1+uk,2
)
as required. It is now straightforward to see that the Hamiltonian given in Eq. 9 of the main text:
H =
∑
i
∑
j
ui,j −
∑
i
3 log (1 + eui,1 + eui,2)
has the property that:
∀i

u˙i,1 =
∑
k∈N(i)
∂H
∂uk,2
u˙i,2 =
∑
k∈N(i)
− ∂H
∂uk,1
as given in Eq. 10 of the main text. Thus the system is a generalized Hamiltonian system obeying
Liouville’s Theorem.
G Linearization of RPS on K4 near the Interior Fixed Point
We briefly show that as in the case for K3, near the fixed point the network replicator with RPS
on K4 behaves as a degenerate Hamiltonian system. First set xi,3 = 1 − xi,1 − xi,2 for all i. This
reduces the dimension of the dynamical system from 12 to 8. Linearizing about the interior fixed
point we see:
x˙i,1 = −1
3
∑
k 6=i
xk,1 + 2xk,2
 (33)
x˙i,2 =
1
3
∑
k 6=i
2xk,1 + xk,2
 (34)
As conjugate momenta, define:
pi,1 =
∑
k 6=i
xk,2 (35)
pi,2 =
∑
k 6=i
xk,1 (36)
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Then we see that:
x˙i,1 = −13 (pi,1 + 2pi,2) (37)
x˙i,2 =
1
3 (2pi,1 + pi,2) (38)
p˙i,1 =
1
3
6xi,1 + 3xi,2 +∑
k 6=i
4xj,1 +
∑
k 6=i
2xj,2
 (39)
p˙i,2 =
1
3
3xi,1 + 6xi,2 +∑
k 6=i
2xj,1 +
∑
k 6=i
4xj,2
 (40)
It is possible to construct an explicit Hamiltonian:
H = 1
3
(∑
i
p2i,1 + p
2
i,2 + pi,1pi,2 +
∑
i
3x2i,1 + 3x
2
i,2 +
∑
i
3xi,1xi,2+
∑
i
∑
j>i
4xi,1xj,1 +
∑
i
∑
j>i
4xi,2xj,2 +
∑
i
∑
j>i
2xi,1xj,2 +
∑
i
∑
j>i
2xi,2xj,1
 (41)
However the fact that the time derivatives of the conjugate momenta can be expressed solely in
terms of the state variables and the time derivatives of the state variables can be expressed solely
in terms of the conjugate momenta is sufficient to show that the system is a Hamiltonian system.
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